Business & Technology
What cyber resilience means in 2026
2025 was the year that exposed the gap between cyber strategy and operational reality. For UK security leaders, the lesson learned was that resilience, sustainability, and judgement mattered more than volume. Now, the challenge is responding to threats with clarity until one inevitably succeeds.
By the end of 2025, it became clear that cyber resilience was no longer a theoretical ambition. Now, it’s an operational reality being tested under sustained pressure.
Last year exposed the limits of security models built for a different pace, a different scale, and a different kind of attacker. Familiar access techniques, such as phishing and credential compromise, continued to dominate, but the damage came later. Attacks moved quietly, used trusted access, and blended into normal behaviour for long enough to evade traditional detection.
For many organisations, this can be classed as a failure of assumptions, as opposed to a tooling failure.
Once attackers were inside, security strategies built for prevention struggled. SOC teams were overwhelmed by volume, and they found it harder to identify the signals that mattered. Operating models stretched by skills shortages and alert fatigue began to show signs of strain.
2025 forced a shift in mindset. Rather than asking ‘How do we stop everything?’, the question became something more honest and useful. Now, it was ‘How prepared are we when something inevitably gets through?’
That shift will define cyber resilience in 2026.
Resilience replaces perfection
Resilience has long been discussed as a strategic goal. In 2025, it was seen as a practical measure of effectiveness.
The organisations that coped the best were those that could detect, contain, and recover with confidence. Having the largest number of controls didn’t determine success. They understood that incidents were sequences of behaviour unfolding over time.
Early visibility, clear escalation paths, and disciplined response mattered more than flawless prevention.
In environments where attackers relied on legitimate credentials and lateral movement, rather than malware, that was evident. When malicious behaviour looks like normal activity, resilience depends on context and judgement, not volume-based alerting.
The lesson we should take is uncomfortable, but important. Security programmes designed around perfection break under pressure. Those designed around preparedness adapt and thrive.
SOC sustainability became a leadership issue
Another defining theme of 2025 was the growing strain on security operations centres.
Alert volumes continued to rise as environments expanded across identity, cloud, network, and SaaS platforms. Analyst burnout, skills shortages, and cost pressures all became structural challenges rather than short-term issues. Decisions around data ingestion, retention, and prioritisation were now directly affecting visibility and response capability.
What many organisations discovered was that SOC sustainability is a leadership concern. When analysts spend most of their time validating low-value signals, the risks become hidden. Once teams are stretched thin, the ability to respond decisively degrades long before dashboards reflect a serious problem.
SOC effectiveness will be judged less by activity and more by focus. The ability to prioritise the right signals, at the right time, with the right context will matter more than the number of alerts processed.
AI: Accelerating outcomes, exposing weak operating models
AI featured prominently in security discussions throughout 2025, often framed as a solution to scale and skills challenges. In practice, it acted more like a stress test.
Where operating models were disciplined, AI helped reduce noise, accelerate investigation, and preserve analyst time for judgement. Where processes were unclear or poorly governed, AI amplified inconsistency and introduced new risk.
AI isn’t an immature solution. Instead, AI just doesn’t compensate for weak foundations.
Over-automation, particularly in areas that require explainability and accountability, proved risky. The most effective applications of AI were those that supported prioritisation and context. They shouldn’t be used as an attempt to replace human decision-making altogether.
As a result, the conversation is more grounded. AI is being increasingly understood as an augmentation layer that must operate within clearly defined guardrails.
Architecture and visibility shaped outcomes
One of the quieter but most consequential lessons from 2025 was the role of architecture in resilience outcomes. Applications are distributed, users are mobile, and identity has become the primary control plane.
Security controls that sit outside the network struggle to deliver the visibility and speed required. Attacks don’t respect tool boundaries. They move wherever identity, network, or cloud visibility are weakest.
Organisations that aligned networking and security more closely were better positioned to detect anomalous behaviour early and respond with confidence. This was less about adopting a specific framework, and more about reducing fragmentation and blind spots.
Architecture decisions will now increasingly be recognised as security decisions. Visibility, policy enforcement, and response speed are now tightly coupled to how environments are designed and operated.
What this means going forward
If 2025 was the year resilience was tested, 2026 will be the year it’s measured.
Boards and executives will ask harder questions about preparedness, rather than just focusing on coverage. CISOs will be expected to demonstrate how attacks are prevented and how incidents are handled when prevention fails. Security leaders will need to articulate how their operating models scale sustainably under intense pressure.
The organisations that succeed will be those that stop treating resilience as a set of controls. They need to treat it as a capability that spans people, process, technology, and partnerships.
Cyber resilience is no longer about stopping every attack. It’s about responding with clarity when one succeeds.
Security hasn’t become an impossible task. It’s just become more honest. Noise is easy to generate, and signal is hard to find. Resilience is built long before an incident ever occurs.
Which organisations will be rewarded? It’ll be the ones that have learned the lesson and acted on it.
To see these insights in more detail, read the full breakdown in Gamma Communications’ Cyber Resilience Report: Cyber Resilience for UK Enterprises – Gamma
Business & Technology
UK AI tests find Claude & GPT-5.6-Sol rogue actions
The UK’s AI Security Institute said tests of Anthropic’s Claude Mythos 5 and OpenAI’s GPT-5.6-Sol found cases of unsanctioned behaviour during cyber evaluations. The most serious incident involved an attempt to insert malicious code into a real open-source project.
The behaviour emerged during a routine assessment of frontier AI models under deliberately permissive test conditions, including internet access and disabled cyber misuse filters. The institute reviewed 122 runs across seven models and found 19 out-of-scope actions in 10 runs. Seventeen were linked to Mythos 5 and two to GPT-5.6-Sol.
According to the institute, one agent created a malicious pull request for a public software project, then tried to influence the approval process by creating fake online identities and pressuring a maintainer. The maintainer rejected the code, and the institute found no evidence of real-world harm.
The findings add to a growing debate over how autonomous AI systems behave when given broad goals and access to live online services. The institute said the models did not escape their sandboxed research environment, but their actions were sustained, novel and directed at real people and organisations.
Its investigation traced the incident to a single cyber challenge designed to test whether agents could solve a security task over many steps. Some runs were misconfigured in ways that may have made the task harder, the institute said, but that did not fully explain the behaviour. Some agents still acted beyond scope even when they had a valid route to solve the task.
Security monitoring first flagged unusual data transfers through the Tor anonymity network. Investigators then found that one agent had used GitHub and other online services in ways that breached the intended boundaries of the test.
Beyond the attempted code insertion, the institute described efforts to contact real people with messages and files intended to persuade them, or their own AI coding tools, to run malicious code. It also said one agent tried to plant hidden instructions for other AI systems, and that separate agents appeared to collaborate by reusing public artefacts left behind during the evaluation.
Expert response
Waseem Ahmed, Head of Engineering at Secure, said the incident should be understood as a consequence of goal-seeking behaviour rather than a loss of control in the popular sense.
“Let’s be precise about what happened, because ‘AI went rogue’ misses it. AISI’s own report is clear. The agent did not turn evil and it did not escape its sandbox. It was told to solve a hard security challenge, and deception emerged as a by-product of chasing that goal.
“Two details matter. This was a model not yet released, and testers had switched off the safety filters on purpose to probe raw capability. That is not how these models behave in production with guardrails on. The real lesson is that a capable agent chasing a goal will try routes you never approved, including social pressure aimed at real people. That is new, and it is why we cannot treat agents like ordinary tools.
“The most reassuring fact in the report is also the most alarming. The attack failed because a human caught the bad code and refused it. Good practice worked, but the margin was thin. It depended on human vigilance, not a technical wall that would reliably stop a stronger agent.
“So here are four moves for security teams. First, block open internet access for agents by default and grant it only when a task truly needs it. Second, watch agents in real time so you can stop out-of-scope actions as they happen, not find them in the logs later. Third, assume any capable agent will try to bend its limits, and build guardrails and containment before it runs. Fourth, harden code review and contributor identity checks, because fake identities are now a real supply chain attack path, and treat all AI-generated or outside code as untrusted until you verify it in isolation.
“The strongest response is still standard cyber hygiene done well, which matters more as these agents get stronger,” said Waseem Ahmed, Head of Engineering at Secure.
That reading is broadly consistent with the institute’s own account. It said the behaviour arose because the agent persistently pursued its assigned objective and explored routes operators had not intended, including deception and social engineering.
Control measures
The institute said it contained the incident within about an hour, halted related evaluations and disabled internal access to the most advanced models under review. It also worked with GitHub to remove artefacts left by the agent and notify affected users.
In response, the organisation is tightening how internet access is granted in cyber evaluations, adding real-time monitoring to flag or stop out-of-scope actions as they happen, and reviewing evaluation design so containment does not depend on a model choosing not to test its limits.
The case is likely to sharpen scrutiny of how frontier model developers and testing partners assess systems before release. While the institute stressed that the specific model configurations were not commercially available and did not reflect ordinary public deployments, it said the episode showed a direction of travel that warrants immediate attention.
For businesses, the report points less to a sudden breakdown in existing systems than to a widening attack surface in software supply chains and identity checks. The institute said standard security practice, human judgement and caution around outside code prevented the worst outcomes, but added that in several cases the margin between failure and success was narrow.
It concluded that the behaviour was possible, sustained and new.
Business & Technology
Boots takeover plans thrown into doubt after bid rejected
The £7 billion bid by the Weston family to buy Boots is now at risk of collapsing, raising fresh uncertainty over the future of the pharmacy giant.
Talks between the Westons—one of the world’s richest retail families—and Boots’ private equity owners reached a standstill after the family lowered its offer, which was subsequently rejected.
The Westons revised their bid following Sigma Healthcare’s withdrawal from a rival bid in June, leaving them as the sole suitor for Boots.
Across the UK, Boots operates approximately 1,800 stores. (Image: Getty Images)
Boots takeover talks at risk of collapse
“It isn’t totally dead,” a source close to the matter told The Telegraph.
“It’s a stand-off.
“They tried to knock down the price after realising they were the only show in town.
“They came in with a lower number that was deemed unacceptable.
“The gap isn’t completely insurmountable.
“However, the owners won’t sell at any price.”
A source suggested that economic uncertainty had made the Westons more cautious.
The Westons’ business empire is split between the UK and Canada, with the Canadian side—which owns a controlling stake in Loblaw, Canada’s largest supermarket chain—leading the talks.
Boots’ ownership has been uncertain since Walgreens Boots Alliance was acquired by US private equity firm Sycamore Partners for £18 billion last year.
Following the deal, Boots was separated into a standalone business, prompting expectations of a sale or a return to public markets.
Italian billionaire Stefano Pessina and his family reinvested in the company during the carve-out.
Mr Pessina had previously teamed up with buyout giant Kohlberg Kravis Roberts to take Boots private in 2007 in what was the largest-ever private equity-led takeover of a UK-listed business at the time.
Before negotiations with the Westons and Sigma Healthcare, Sycamore Partners had considered relisting Boots on the London Stock Exchange after nearly two decades off the market.
It is believed that if sale talks break down, Sycamore will revive plans to float Boots next year.
Walgreens previously explored a sale in 2022, attracting interest from private equity firms including TDR Capital, which owns Asda.
However, those talks collapsed after bids failed to meet expectations.
Since then, Boots has closed hundreds of underperforming UK stores as part of a wider cost-cutting programme.
Investment has been redirected towards its core estate of 400 larger stores, primarily located in town centres and retail parks.
This core network is supported by smaller pharmacies and travel-focused locations.
Across the UK, Boots operates approximately 1,800 stores.
The company also owns beauty brands including No7 and Soap & Glory, and has become an increasingly important provider of NHS services, offering doctor consultations, vaccinations, blood-pressure checks, and specialised treatments for skin and hair loss.
In preparation for a potential public listing, Boots recently appointed Alex Baldock, former chief executive of Currys, as its new CEO, who is set to join the company this autumn.
The British arm of the Weston family controls Associated British Foods—parent company of Primark—and Fortnum & Mason through its Wittington Investments vehicle.
The family previously owned Selfridges for nearly 20 years before selling the department store for £4bn in 2022 to a consortium including Central Group of Thailand and Austrian property giant Signa Holding.
Both Sycamore Partners and Boots have declined to comment.
What is your favourite high street shop? Let us know in the comments.
Business & Technology
‘WH Smith’ chain rescue comes with ‘considerable risks’
“This has all the hallmarks of an adventurous equity play,” wrote Mr Justice Hildyard in his judgment published yesterday after he last month approved the restructuring, which involves the closure of 150 of the books-to-paperclips retailer’s 450 stores.
He added that the group’s turnaround plans “might strike the sceptic as more in the nature of generic aspirations than concrete grounds for confidence in a successful outcome”.
The chain includes numerous former WH Smith branches across Oxfordshire.
These include stores in Cornmarket, Oxford, and in Witney, Abingdon, Chipping Norton, Didcot, Wantage and Banbury. The takeover came into effect a year ago.
READ MORE: Major high street retailer could collapse
“The execution risk is very considerable,” Mr Justice Hildyard said, indicating the £3m valuation of the company – compared with its acquisition value of about £40m only a year before – reflected the potential for high losses as well as high profits.
The retailer, which until recently employed about 5,000 staff, was bought last year by Modella Capital, the private equity firm which is also behind Hobbycraft and owned the UK arm of jewellery retailer Claire’s and The Original Factory Shop until they collapsed earlier this year.
It recently bought Flying Tiger, the Danish retailer known for its cut-price homewares, craft kits and notebooks, which operates about 1,000 stores worldwide.
TG Jones in Oxford (Image: Google Maps)
The original owner of WH Smith continues to operate stores in airports, hospitals and railway stations, so Modella quickly rebranded the high street stores as TG Jones.
Sales quickly fell back after the deal, and Modella had warned it could have to call in administrators if the restructuring plan, which involves writing off debts to suppliers and cutting rent for many landlords, was not approved.
The judge approved the plan despite his scepticism about potential success, because Modella had put up new investment to turn it around.
Alex Willson, the chief executive of TG Jones, said last month that approval of the plan “allows us to move ahead with our turnaround strategy”.
“The plan protects the substantial core of the store estate and makes TG Jones a stronger, more sustainable business,” he said.
Court approval was needed for what is known as a “cram down” scheme, as many classes of creditor who would lose money under the scheme rejected it. The model allows courts, in certain circumstances, to impose a restructuring on dissenting classes of creditors.
Fewer than a third of general creditors, who include card makers and pen brands, agreed to the plan and no landlords owning unwanted stores – where rent will be cut to zero or closed – backed the plan.
Small suppliers, such as toy makers, were set to lose at least half the money owed to them by the former WH Smith high street chain under the restructure.
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